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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
KASCO SERVICES CORPORATION, ] 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
LARRY D. BENSON and ] 
CONNIE A. BENSON dba ] 
TRI-B-SUPPLY, ] 
Defendant-Appellee, ] 
) Case No. 900260 
> Priority No. 11 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT KASCO SERVICES CORPORATION 
INTRODUCTION 
Kasco has established its entitlement to injunctive 
relief against Larry, Connie and Robert Benson. Bensons concede 
that Larry Benson and Kasco entered into the 1982 employment 
Agreement. They have not disputed its terms and they have not 
appealed the district court' s ruling that the covenant was 
reasonable and necessary. Instead, Bensons resurrect their 
arguments opposing Kasco' s petition for interlocutory appeal 
(which this Court already decided) and arguments involving 
matters outside the Agreement that ignore principles of contract 
law and rules governing non-competition agreements in Utah. 
We will answer in full each of Bensons scatter-shot 
arguments. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Kasco/ s Petition Was Timely 
For the third time during these appellate proceedings, 
Bensons contend that Kasco' s Petition for Interlocutory Appeal 
(not Kasco's brief) is "untimely" and should "be denied." (Red 
Brief, p. 10).l Kasco has answered this and will not restate 
its entitlement to interlocutory appeal again here. (See 
Kasco's Reply Memorandum in Support of Injunction Pending 
Disposition of Petition Under Rule 5 and Pending Appeal, pp. 3-
5). Because this Court already granted interlocutory appeal 
(R. 947), Bensons' argument, which is incorrect, is moot. 
2. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Denying Kasco' s Motion To Modify The Order Of 
Injunction 
Bensons incorrectly argue that, once entered, the 
district court's injunction order became immutable, beyond 
judicial power to correct absent some change in circumstance or 
law. (Red Brief, p. 12). 2 Courts have no such constraint. 
Courts are empowered with plenary authority and procedural rules 
to modify any order in the interests of justice. 
Respondents' brief is referred to here as "Red Brief"; 
Kasco's opening brief is referred to here as "Blue Brief". 
2Bensons base their position on System Federation No. 91 v. 
Wright. 364 U.S. 642, 81 S. Ct. 368, 5 L. ed. 2d 349 (1961), which 
involved the narrow question of whether post-injunction changes in 
law or the circumstances would warrant modifying an injunction. 
The decision did not hold, as Bensons imply, that such changes 
were the only grounds for modification. 364 U. S. at 647, 81 S. 
Ct. at 371. 
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In cases where injunctions issue under a non-
competition covenant, as here, "[a] preliminary injunction may 
be modified at any time whenever the ends of justice require 
such action. " Hansen v. Edwards, 83 Nev. 189, 426 P. 2d 792, 794 
(1967)(injunction under non-competition agreement modified on 
appeal with no change in law or circumstance). The court in 
Kodekey Electronics, Inc. v. Mechanex Corp. . 500 F. 2d 110, 112-
13 (10th Cir. 1974), based upon its plenary powers and Rule 
60(b), affirmed a trial court's grant of a motion, like Kasco's, 
"to modify injunction" to extend the injunction under a non-
competition agreement. As Kasco explained to the trial court, 
under Rule 60(b) courts may "in the furtherance of justice" 
modify any final judgment or "order" for "any other reason" 
justifying relief from its terms. Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure; (R. 929). See also Rees v. Albertson' s Inc. , 
587 P. 2d 130, 132 (Utah 1978)(it is "the unquestioned 
prerogative of the Court, either upon its own motion, or 
application of a party, to change or correct any order which it 
judges to have been entered by * mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 
or excusable neglect' as provided by Rule 60(b), U. R. C. P. " ) . 
The long-recognized and understandable judicial power to modify 
an injunction to effect justice is "beyond question" and may be 
exercised "by the trial court . . . [or] upon appeal by the 
appellate tribunal. " In re Arkansas Railroad Rates, 168 F. 720, 
722 (E. D. Ark. 1909). 
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As these authorities show, both the trial court and 
this Court may correct the trial court's injunction to conform 
to the parties' Agreement. Hansen, 426 P. 2d at 794. 
3. Larry Benson' s Post-Employment Restrictions Are 
Enforceable 
During argument before the trial court, Bensons' 
counsel conceded that Larry Benson should be enjoined: 
YOUR HONOR, ADMITTEDLY, THOSE KINDS OF 
THINGS, LETTERS GOING OUT WITH LARRY' S NAME 
ON IT, EVEN THOUGH HE DIDN'T SIGN THIS ONE, 
LARRY'S -- GOING OUT WITH HIS NAME ON IT 
OUGHT NOT TO BE DONE AND IT OUGHT TO BE 
ENJOINED . . . . 
NOW, ADMITTEDLY, LARRY DID SOME THINGS THAT 
HE SHOULDN' T HAVE DONE. LARRY WAS INVOLVED 
EARLY ON. HE MADE SOME PURCHASES OF 
EQUIPMENT AND HE SHOULDN'T HAVE DONE THAT. 
THAT MAY BE CONSTRUED AS COMPETING. BUT, 
ADMITTEDLY, LARRY MADE A SALE OR TWO, 
ADMITTEDLY, LARRY CONTACTED A CUSTOMER OR 
TWO PRIOR TO THE INJUNCTION . . . . 
(R. 972, pp. 43, 48). 
Ignoring their admissions, (and having not appealed 
the district court's finding that the Agreement was enforceable) 
Bensons now belatedly challenge enforceability, contending that 
Kasco has not shown (1) sufficient consideration for the 
Agreement; (2) that Larry Bensons was "special"; and (3) 
irreparable harm. (Red Brief, pp. 13-16). Each of these 
elements has been established here, as the district court found. 
(Blue Brief, pp. 19-20, R. 973, p. 6). 
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a. Consideration Was Provided 
The trial court expressly found adequate consideration 
for the Agreement and never wavered from its holding. Under the 
Agreement, Larry Benson's covenant was given "in consideration 
for [Kasco] employing Sales Representative [Larry Benson]." 
(Addendum A, p. 1). This is a promise of continued employment, 
contrary to Bensons' characterization. (Red Brief, p. 13). In 
Utah, an offer "of continued employment" is "adequate 
consideration for the [employee's] submissions to the terms of 
the [non-competition] covenant. " System Concepts, Inc. v. 
Dixon, 669 P.2d, 421, 426 (Utah 1983). The promise of 
employment provides abundant consideration regardless of whether 
the employment contract is entered at or after the date of 
hiring. See Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608, 237 P. 2d 
at 823, 824-26 (1951)("continuing contract of employment" was 
consideration for employee' s non-competition covenant in 
agreement signed after the employee began work); System 
Concepts, 669 P.2d at 426. 
Neither of the Oregon cases Bensons cite holds, as 
Bensons imply, that all non-competition covenants not executed 
"soon" after the employee begins work lack consideration. See 
Perthou v. Stewart, 243 F. Supp. 655 (D. Or. 1965); Mail-Well 
Envelope Co. v. Salev, 262 Or. 143, 497 P. 2d 364, 366 (Or. 
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1972). Bensons failed to note that, even in Oregon, "where 
one already employed" enters a subsequent non-competition 
agreement, consideration is provided "bv a promise of continued 
employment, express or implied, or some other good 
consideration. " McCombs vs. McClelland, 223 Or. 475, 354 P. 2d 
311, 315 (1960). Here, in addition to the express promise in 
Larry Benson' s Agreement, a promise of continued employment was 
clearly implied from the circumstances as Larry Benson admits: 
Q. So you knew as a condition of continued 
employment that you' d be required to sign 
the agreement; is that correct? 
A. It certainly appeared that way, yes, at the time. 
(Addencum 0, pp. 271-72; 4 Red Brief, p. 18). Plainly, the 
district court' s finding of consideration was not an abuse of 
discretion. Systems Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P. 2d 421, 425 
(Utah 1983)(grant of injunction will not be disturbed on appeal 
absent abuse of discretion, or unless rendered clearly against 
the weight of the evidence). Bensons offer no basis to overturn 
this finding which is consistent with the law in Utah and 
^Indeed, neither decision even sets forth the precise terms 
of the covenants in question. Perthou v. Stewart, 243 F. Supp. 655 
(D. Or. 1965); Mail-Well Envelope Co. v. Saley. 497 P. 2d 364 (Or. 
1972). Moreover, Bensons do not explain why consideration is 
provided in agreements entered "soon" after the employee starts 
work, but is lacking when agreements are entered later if the 
promise of continued employment is the same in each. 
4Addenda 0 and P are attached hereto and lettered in 
continuing sequence with Kasco' s Addendum previously filed. 
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contrary to the different situations and holdings of the Oregon 
cases Bensons cite. 
b. Larry Benson Was Unique 
Bensons again attack the trial court' s order, arguing 
that Larry Benson' s status immunized him from injunction. (Red 
Brief, pp. 14-16). Relying on Robbins v. Finlav, 645 P. 2d 623 
(Utah 1982), Bensons contend that Larry Benson was a mere 
fungible "salesman", lacking special or unique attributes 
justifying injunctive relief. (Red Brief, pp. 14-15). As we 
have shown, Larry Benson was much more. He was required to 
nurture and develop close, on-going relationships with Kasco' s 
customers and potential customers. (R. 41-42). The success of 
Kasco's business in the Utah territory depended upon the good 
will Larry Benson generated as Kasco' s agent. This is reflected 
in the testimony of Kasco' s former customers who promptly left 
Kasco to do business with Tri-B-Supply. (Addenda C, D, H and I; 
R. 42-43). Larry Benson was responsible for sales and service 
and made regular visits to Kasco's customers. (R. 41-42). He 
successfully employed Kasco' s business techniques and became one 
of Kasco' s top five territory managers, with direct access to 
Kasco's executive officers. (R. 41-42); Blue Brief, pp. 20-21). 
These facts readily distinguish Larry Benson from the 
employee in Robbins who sold (not serviced) hearing aids. 645 
P. 2d at 627. There is no mention that the Robbins salesman ever 
met the same customer twice, yet alone that he made regular (if 
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in the territory but that clients continued to leave Kasco for 
"Larry Benson's" business. (R. 146-49). Bensons have not 
disputed this and no contrary evidence was offered. 
Utah courts have found that the "irreparable harm" 
requirement is satisfied where the misappropriation of a 
company's good will is "threatened" in violation of terms of a 
non-competition agreement. System Concepts, 669 P. 2d at 428 
("irreparable harm" is shown by the "likely and threatened 
misappropriation of [the employer's] confidential information 
and good will"); Allen, 257 P. 2d at 826-27. Kasco established 
irreparable harm by showing that Bensons have misappropriated 
its good will through Larry Benson' s contract breachs and Connie 
Benson' s and Robert Benson' s exploitation of that breach. (Blue 
Brief, pp. 19-23, 25-31). Bensons ignore this and other 
evidence showing that they and Tri-B-Supply have taken over 
numerous "former" Kasco customers and were seeking more prior to 
this Court's order of injunction on appeal. (Addenda J and M; 
R. 42; R. 96-100; R. 146-49). Kasco' s damages from these losses 
are not readily calculable, contrary to Bensons' unsupported 
claim. System Concepts, 669 P. 2d at 429 ("any final judgment 
would not be able to effectively restore to [the employer] the 
benefits of its good will attached to the defendant"). Bensons 
have not disputed these authorities. 
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Agreement, Larry Benson could not breach the post-employment 
non-competition provisions until "immediately following 
termination of his employment", not before. (Appendix A, 1F1F 
4. 2-4. 6. ) The Agreement does not require him to enter into 
another agreement or allow him to terminate the Agreement 
unilaterally. (Addendum A). 
Further, Larry Benson' s actions in 1988 were not an 
anticipatory breach of the Agreement, and Bensons do not contend 
otherwise. No anticipatory breach will occur without a 
"positive and unequivocal manifestation on the part of the 
repudiating party that he will not render the required 
performance when it is due." Rancho Pescado. Inc. v. 
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. , 140 Ariz. 174, 680 P. 2d 1235, 
1247 (1984) citing McMahon v. Fiberglass Fabricators, Inc. , 17 
Ariz. App. 190, 192, 496 P.2d 616, 618 (1972). Based upon Larry 
Benson's 1988 actions and alleged statements that he "would not 
continue employment under the non-compete agreement" or that he 
felt the Agreement was "null and void" etc., one could only 
guess whether he would (by implication) actually compete after 
leaving Kasco. This simply falls short of anticipatory breach: 
P. 2d 40, 40-42 (Cal. App. 1956); Sitlinaton v. Fulton, 281 F. 2d 
552 (10th Cir. 1960); and Einot. Inc. v. Einot Sales Co. , 154 Neb. 
760, 49 N. W. 2d 625, 627 (1951). Election of remedies is not an 
issue here and Kasco has not sought rescission. Finally, as we 
have shown, no breach of Larry Benson' s Agreement occurred prior 
to the time Larry Benson began competing against Kasco in 
violation of his Agreement. Kasco did not waive Larry Benson' s 
violations but promptly sought to enjoin them. (R. 40-43). 
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grounds for rescission (as the trial court previously held), 
"the court is powerless to relieve a party from the effects of 
his contract. " Allen, 237 P. 2d at 826. 
Finally, the issue appears moot. Bensons concede that 
at the time Larry Benson failed to execute another contract, 
Kasco "could insist on compliance with the provision" 
prohibiting post-employment competition. (Red Brief, p. 18). 
If Larry Benson's post-employment covenant was enforceable then, 
it is enforceable now, as the trial court found by enjoining 
Larry Benson. (R. 973, p. 6). 
Nothing in the Agreement or Larry Benson' s actions or 
the law allowed the district court to vary the Agreement' s terms 
-- terms that the court had already found reasonable. (R. 973, 
p. 6). The district court's ruling was error.6 
5. Equitable Modification 
Bensons erroneously imply that the district court was 
justified in cutting short Larry Benson's injunction -- contrary 
to the Agreement's terms -- because the court "could" have found 
the length unreasonable and subject to equitable modification.7 
6Moreover, the district court' s ruling and findings conflict. 
While ruling that Larry Benson' s actions in 1988 somehow 
"terminated" the non-competition provision, inconsistently, the 
trial court enforced them. (R. 973, p. 7). Moreover, even if 
"notice" were some operable event under the Agreement (and it is 
not), the Agreement does not permit retroactive running of the 
non-competition provisions which expressly apply only after Larry 
Benson's termination. (Addendum A, H 4. 3). 
7Kasco has discovered no Utah case permitting judicial 
alteration of covenant terms. 
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the bond Kasco posted from any loss they could wrongfully incur 
during these proceedings. (Addendum M). 
Bensons also suggest that the Court should balance the 
parties' "differing financial strength" and force Kasco to bear 
the brunt of Larry Benson' s contract breach. (Red Brief, p. 
21). This is baseless. The relative size, nature or financial 
position of the non-breaching party does not excuse the other 
party' s contractual obligations or limit contractual remedies. 8 
6. Connie and Robert Benson Should be Enjoined 
Bensons argue that Connie and Robert should not be 
enjoined because (1) they lack privity of contract; (2) Kasco's 
authorities are inapposite; (3) Kasco's pleadings are deficient; 
(4) evidence of their wrongdoing is lacking; and (5) Kasco is a 
larger business than Tri-B-Supply. Bensons are incorrect. 
a. Privity is Not Recfuired 
Predictably, Bensons argue that Connie Benson and 
Robert Benson should not be enjoined because they lack privity 
of contract with Kasco. (Red Brief, p. 21). As we have 
Bensons also contend that consumers "would" suffer if 
Bensons are enjoined, implying that Kasco would monopolize the 
market with over-priced, "inferior goods and services". (Red 
Brief, p. 21). Such disparaging remarks are baseless and beside 
the point. Moreover, as Larry Benson knows, the butcher supply 
business is competitive and Kasco has competitors besides Tri-B-
Supply which, as Larry Benson admits, "on many occasions" were 
"working the very same accounts [that Larry Benson as Kasco's 
agent] was working the very same day I was working them. " 
(Addendum 0, p. 101). 
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explained,, however, privity is not required (Blue Brief, pp. 
25-31). 
b . C a s e A u t n o r n y 
Bens e n s c i a - . t : 31 Ka-:--r ; s u p p o r t i n g 'cases ar--
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1990), adopted the "better" view that a non-signatory to a non-
competition agreement may be enjoined without privity of 
contract. 
c. Kasco's Verified Complaint and Proposed 
Amended Verified Complaint 
In desperation, Bensons pick at Kasco' s Verified 
Complaint, contending it "fails to allege any wrongdoing" on the 
part of Connie Benson. (Red Brief, p. 22). The Verified 
Complaint, however, alleges that "Defendants have already 
misappropriated plaintiff s . . . good will by soliciting 
customers away from plaintiff" and that Kasco will suffer 
irreparable injury to "its good will" if Larry Benson, Connie 
Benson and/or Tri-B-Supply are allowed "to continue in the 
business of selling and [servicing] butcher products and to use 
[Larry Benson's] special relationships with and unique knowledge 
of plaintiffs' customers" . . . and that "such misappropriation" 
of, among other things, "its good will can only be estimated by 
conjecture . . . ." (R. 6-7, 1FH 13-14). This, along with 
related allegations of the Verified Complaint, provides "a short 
and plain statement" of the claim against Connie Benson showing 
Kasco is entitled to relief." Rule 8(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Moreover, Kasco sought to expand its claims against 
Connie Benson and to add Robert Benson as a defendant based upon 
information obtained after Larry Benson was enjoined indicating 
that Connie and Robert Benson took steps to continue Tri-B-
Supply' s butcher supply business. (R. 366-368). The district 
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court erroneously denied Kasco' s motion, as shown below (Page 
22, iiilid J. 
d. C o n n i e anu Kubbi t Beiisuii ^ A p ^ t *?„ . .. . y 
Benson' s C o n t r a c t B r e a c h e s 
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9
 B e n s o n s a ,1 s o a r g u e t h a t "' Kasco' s p r o b 1 e m"' I s :i t: s f a :i 1 u r e t o 
"keep a sa 1 esman in the territory." (Red Brief, p 23) Bensons 
ignore that Larry Benson remained with Kasco for over a decade in 
the Utah territory. Moreover, to the extent Bensons' remark 
relates to current circumstances,, it simply highlights damages 
Kasco has experienced as a result of the high percentage of former 
customers misappropriated by Bensons. The greatly reduced client 
base provides a much smaller financial incentive to current 
t e rri t ory mana ge rs. 
l0Whether Larry Bens on violated the terms of h i s i nj unction 
has not yet been raised as an issue before the district court and 
] 1.111 e d i s c o v e r y h a s b e e n d o n e c o n c e r n i n g :i 1:. 
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Bensons' unsupported statements, Larry Benson need not be with 
Tri-B-Supply now before Connie and Robert Benson may be 
enjoined. Bensons treated Tri-B-Supply as their joint business 
and held themselves out to the public that way. (Blue Brief, 
pp. 29-31). Courts "will treat them in the manner they 
operated." McCart, 470 N. E. 2d at 762. " [l]f this Court were to 
enjoin [the former employee] only and allow [the spouse] to 
continue the [competing business] at the same site and with the 
same customers the court would be ignoring the business 
realities of the situation, frustrating the proper purpose of . 
. . the contract, and affording [the employee] indirect 
competition and benefit in specific violation of the contract 
terms. " L&. 
Connie Benson' s complicity in Larry Benson' s breach 
and Connie Benson' s and Robert Benson' s exploitation of that 
breach is established by overwhelming evidence which Kasco will 
not recite again here. (Blue Brief, pp. 10-17; 29-31). Bensons 
sidestep these undisputed facts and claim that "price" was the 
"important determining factor" in customer decisions to abandon 
Kasco for Tri-B-Supply. (Red Brief, pp. 23-24). Even if this 
were true (and it is not) it is beside the point. Connie Benson 
and Robert Benson as Tri-B-Supply are not entitled to exploit 
Larry Benson' s contract breaches and their association with him 
regardless of the prices they charge. Moreover, Randal Heath, a 
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former Kasco customer, explained that any difference between 
Kasco' s and Tri-B-Supply' s prices was insignificant: 
I looked at the prices, and I had — I went 
and got a copy of my last Kasco invoice, I 
believe . . . and I looked at them, and I 
knew their' s was on a 4-month. On a 3-month 
[Tri-B-Supply' s] prices looked a lot cheaper 
on paper. But in reality they aren' t that 
much cheaper when you consider you' re going 
to be served four times a year instead of 
three times a year. So pricewise, they were 
about the same . . . . [W]hen I figured it 
out with [Tri-B-Supply'sj knives and blades 
and Kasco' s price, it seemed like we were, 
you know, within like ten bucks. You know, 
that' s not much. They were just a little 
bit cheaper. But price wasn' t the -- wasn' t 
why I went. 
(Addendum P, pp. 30, 39). 
Bensons also argue that Connie Benson (not Larry 
Benson) discovered in the "telephone book" the names of those to 
whom the March 10, 1989, Tri-B-Supply letter was sent. (Red 
Brief, p. 25). While Kasco disputes this, the important (and 
undisputed) fact is that the letter tied both Larry and Connie 
Benson with Tri-B-Supply, "our own business" offering "more 
frequent service" and "less expensive service in the future." 
(Addendum F). Connie Benson's and Robert Benson's 
exploitation of that association (which arose from Larry 
Benson's breach) requires that they too be enjoined. See 
Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Danahy, 21 Mass. App. 488, 488 
N. E. 2d 22, 31 (1986)(injunction to prevent third parties "from 
obtaining benefits from [the covenantors' ] violation of the non-
competition covenants" where the covenantor was closely 
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identified with the third party "in the mind of the public"); 
Ingredient Technology Corp. v. Nay, 532 F. Supp. 627, 631 
(E. D. N. Y. 1982) (wife and son enjoined with covenantor from 
exploiting breaches of the non-competition agreement that the 
husband entered). 
e. Corporations Can Enforce Contract Rights 
Bensons refer to Kasco as "an enormous multi-state 
conglomerate" whose contractual and equitable rights should be 
ignored because Tri-B-Supply is comparatively smaller. (Red 
Brief, p. 26). This simply does not wash. Kasco, a 
corporation, is entitled to enforce its contract rights as a 
natural person would. Utah Constitution Art. XII, § 4 
("corporations shall have the right to sue, and shall be subject 
to be sued, in all courts, and like cases as natural persons"). 
It is wrong for Bensons to misappropriate the proprietary 
interests of another whether the victim is a corporation or an 
individual. Moreover, much more is at stake for Kasco than 
Bensons (the self-styled "small local competitor") admit. (Red 
Brief, p. 26). Kasco's Utah territory (Larry Benson's former 
territory) is a significant market area in Kasco' s business. 
Larry Benson reached production levels in the territory that 
placed him among Kasco's top five employees. (R. 41-42). 
Bensons have not disputed this, and their efforts to down play 
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the staggering impact Tri-B-Supply has on Kasco' s business are 
of no avail. (Addendum J). n 
7. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion bv Denying 
Kasco's Motion to Amend Complaint 
As Kasco has shown, Robert Benson should be enjoined 
from exploiting Larry Benson' s contract breaches and 
misappropriating Kasco's goodwill. (Blue Brief, pp. 34-35). 
Robert Benson's lack of "privity" is not prerequisite. McCart, 
470 N. E. 2d at 762. Thus, Bensons argue in vain that the denial 
of Kasco' s motion to amend its complaint to add Robert Benson as 
a defendant was "futile" or made in "bad faith". (Red Brief, 
pp. 26-28). 
Bensons do not contend that granting Kasco' s 
motion in all other respects would prejudice them in any way. 
Indeed, they have not opposed Kasco' s other proposed amendments. 
Kasco's motion should have been freely granted because justice 
requires now, as it did before, that Kasco receive the 
injunctive relief to which it is entitled. The denial of 
uBensons again imply -- without support -- that Tri-B-Supply 
has only obtained customers through "better service, better 
quality, and a better price". (Red Brief, p. 26). As shown 
above, this is beside the point and && evidence was before the 
trial court (or presented here) comparing item-by-item pricing, 
quality or service. Moreover, Bensons' claim is inconsistent with 
the high percentage of customers who left Kasco to join Tri-B-
Supply soon after Tri-B-Supply' s March 10th letter was received or 
following Tri-B-Supply' s first visit. (Blue Brief, p. 12; 
Addendum J). With such limited, one-time exposure, these former 
customers had no basis to compare "service" or "quality." 
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Kasco's motion was an abuse of discretion. See Chenev v. 
Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 211, 381 P. 2d 86, 91 (1963). 
8. Kasco Has Shown Its Entitlement to Prospective 
Injunctive Relief 
Undisputedly, Larry Benson' s Agreement with Kasco is 
intended to provide a period following Larry Benson' s 
termination during which Kasco could preserve its customer base 
and the good will Larry Benson generated as Kasco' s agent. 
Bensons, however, have deprived Kasco of this right by 
misappropriating Kasco' s good will and opposing Kasco' s 
enforcement efforts during the pendency of these proceedings. 
Like the employer in Roanoke Engineering Sales Co. , Inc. . v. 
Rosenbaum. 223 Va. 548, 290 S. E. 2d 882, 886 (1982), Kasco 
requested prospective enforcement "as soon as it could address 
this court after an appeal had been granted . . . . M (Kasco' s 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Injunction Pending Disposition of 
Petition Under Rule 5 and Pending Appeal, pp. 10-11). Thus, the 
question this Court must answer, as other courts have, is "Who 
should suffer the consequences of this unfortunate delay . . . ?" 
Id. 
Bensons ask the Court to ignore the fact that they 
have "participated in the prohibited activities during the 
course of the litigation. " Capelouto v. Orkin Exterminating Co. 
of Florida. Inc. , 183 So. 2d 532, 534-35 (Fla. 1966). The 
result they urge would reward the breaching party and encourage 
protracted litigation and dilatory tactics. I_£. To adopt their 
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view "would be to nullify, in major part, the effectiveness of 
such agreements. " I&. See also Kodekey Electronics, Inc. v. 
Mechanex Corp., 500 F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir. 1974)(extended the 
injunction to compensate for the period during which the 
covenantee evaded its terms, noting that "if the extension were 
not granted, the [covenantee] would in effect be deprived of the 
benefit of the non-competition agreement"). As the Capelouto 
court recognized, "[t]his is particularly true since in most 
cases of this kind, . . . money damages are not susceptible of 
proof with the required degree of certainty and therefore cannot 
be awarded." I^ L (emphasis supplied). 
Bensons do not question the reasoning of these 
authorities. Instead, they cite cases which in effect deny 
prospective injunctive relief — without analysis -- and argue 
that such relief here would be "only punitive." (Red Brief, p. 
31). As their only support, they again misrepresent the trial 
court's "findings" and contend that the court "found" that Kasco 
had "sufficient time to protect its good will." (Red Brief, p. 
31). As Kasco has shown, the district court made n& such 
finding. Indeed, neither the district court nor Bensons can 
contend that Kasco has had sufficient time to protect its good 
will when Kasco has not had one minute free from Bensons' 
competition, contrary to the Agreement' s terms. (Addendum A 11 
4.3). Prospective relief here is by no means "punitive;" it 
would provide the protection to which the parties agreed by 
f:\wpl\188\00000ld4.W51 
12/10/90 24 
applying the remedy which equity requires. See Systems 
Concepts, 669 P. 2d at 421, 424, 430 (granting prospective 
injunctive relief). Bensons' conduct should not be rewarded. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, Kasco is entitled to injunctive 
relief against Bensons even though the non-competition period 
under Larry Benson' s agreement has expired during the pendency 
of this appeal. Kasco requests the following relief: (1) that 
Larry Benson be enjoined prospectively for a total of 18 months 
as the parties agreed and not 12 months as the district court 
ordered; (2) that Connie and Robert Benson be similarly enjoined 
from exploiting Larry Benson's contract breaches; and (3) that 
Kasco be allowed to amend its complaint to add claims and name 
Robert Benson as a defendant. 
DATED this 10th day of December, 1990. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
vid if. Arrirfigto^ 426; 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant, Kasco S^vices 
Corporation 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
KASCO SERVICES CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LARRY D. BENSON and CONNIE 
A- BENSON, dba TRI-B-SUPPLY, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 89-0901724 
Judge David S. Young 
Deposition of: 
LARRY P. BENSON 
Deposition of LARRY D. BENSON, taken at the 
instance and request of the Plaintiff, at Vancott, Bagley, 
Cornwall & McCarthy, 50 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
Wednesday, the 31st day of May, 1989, at the hour of 9:20 
a.m., before VICKY MCDANIEL, a Certified Shorthand Reporter 
and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, Utah License 
No. 285. 
* * * 
Associated Professional Reporters 
101 
MR. TATEOKA: Assuming he knew their service 
schedule? 
Q (By Mr, Arrington) Yes. Were you pretty aware 
of the service schedules of your competitors? 
A No. I don't know the service schedule really 
mattered. 
Q Would you like to have known that? 
A I think the big thing is go in and know their 
needs. I know for a fact that PBI was working—their man 
was staying in the same motels I was staying around the 
territory. On many occasions he was working the very same 
accounts I was working the very same day I was working them. 
Q Was that uncommon? 
A No. 
Q It was probably more common than not, wasn't it? 
A There was many times I ran into the Southwest Saw 
man, he was in there when I walked in. 
Q Do you think Southwest Saw had a sense for what 
your schedule was as a—or would inquire after your schedule 
with your customers, your Keene customers? 
A I don't think that he cared. Just like me, I 
don't care. Service schedules don't mean anything to me. 
If I was going out after a man, I'd go after the business, I 
wouldn't care who'd just been there. You're not afraid of 
those kind of things when you're a good salesperson. 
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A Alex Doyle told me that. 
Q He was there? He's the individual who made that 
statement? 
A He was conducting the meeting. 
Q Did you elect to sign the agreement? 
A Did I elect to sign—I obviously did sign it, but 
I didn't elect to sign it, no. 
Q How can you say that? Couldn't you have left the 
meeting? 
A I could have left the meeting or Lord knows what 
would have happened. That guy was nuts. 
Q Well, what do you mean by that? 
A I mean, Alex Doyle was crazy, and KASCO can 
testify to that, Keene can testify to that. 
Q Well, you could have left the meeting, though; is 
that correct? 
A Correct. 
Q You could have left the room and not signed the 
contract; is that correct? 
A Correct. 
Q Why didn't you do that? 
A I was instructed by my sales manager that 
wouldn't be a good idea if I wanted to continue my 
employment. 
Q So you knew as a condition of continued 
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employment that you'd be required to sign the agreement; is 
that correct? 
A It certainly appeared that way, yes, at the time, 
Q In paragraph 7 you say you signed the agreement 
under duress. What do you mean? 
A I would say it's duress when you're told to do 
something you don't want to do and it's put to you in such a 
way that you feel like you're obligated to do it. 
Q You signed this agreement but you didn't want to 
sign it? 
A You're right, strictly because—forget it. 
Q You could have not signed the agreement; is that 
correct? 
A I could have not signed it. 
Q Is that correct? 
A Correct. 
Q Did anyone threaten you with legal action or 
physical harm if you didn't sign the agreement? 
A They had no cause for either. 
Q I agree. 
A I'm bigger than they are. 
Q In paragraph 9 you say that "All of the contacts 
that I had with grocery stores were made prior to my 
becoming employed with Keene Corporation." Are you saying 
that there was not one single store that you hadn't 
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